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Abstract 
 
We analyze the welfare effect of allowing a new university in a local area where another 
university is already operating. We use a two-city model in which individuals, whose education 
depends on the average peer ability (peer group effect), can sort across cities by facing a mobility 
cost. Com- paring monopoly with a two-university system we find that introducing the second 
university is always welfare improving. We obtain a symmetric Nash equilibrium for every 
mobility costs and asymmetric Nash equilibria only for sufficiently low mobility costs. In 
particular, in the symmetric scenario both universities have the same peer groups (lower than the 
peer group under monopoly) and the same number of students. The asymmetric scenario instead 
is such that the "top" ("bottom") university has a peer group higher (lower) than the monopolistic 
one. Moreover, we find that the symmetric scenario always induces the highest welfare. After 
checking for equilibrium refinements we find that asymmetric equilibria are never strong Nash 
whereas the symmetric equilibrium is strong Nash only for sufficiently high mobility costs. 
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1 Introduction
In the last decades empirical evidence confirms a proliferation of universities in
Europe.1 A recent publication by the British Department for Innovation, Uni-
versities and Skills, "A New University Challenge; Unlocking Britain’s Talent",
shows the intention of the British government to rise the number of local insti-
tutions as policy to widen higher education participation to socially excluded
individuals.2 In the document it reads: "Over and above their contribution to
economic regeneration and development, universities and other higher education
providers are seen as making a real difference to the cultural life of our towns
and cities. So it is not surprising that increasing numbers of towns and cities
are seeking to offer higher education. We want to make the process of gaining a
higher education campus more open and more transparent."
Such a policy is based on the empirical evidence that geographical distance
and peer group quality are respectively a barrier and a strengthening to the
higher education participation.3
We study the welfare implications of introducing a new university in a two-
city scenario where only one university is active and students’ human capital
positively depends on own and average ability (peer group effect). We find that
one more university is always welfare improving, especially when leading to an
equal two-university system.
We assume that, in each city, students are uniformly and independently dis-
tributed according to their ability. They are free to attend university (if any)
in their city or in the other, with the second option implying a mobility cost.
The two universities are then endogenously differentiated only according to stu-
dents’ average ability and number. We find both a symmetric and asymmetric
Nash equilibria. In the former, existing for every mobility cost, both universities
have the same peer group effects (lower than the monopolistic peer group) and
the same number of students. In the latter, existing only for low mobility costs,
peer groups effects are different, with the one in the "top" ("bottom") university
higher (lower) than the monopolistic one. Although the asymmetric system is
1In a recent empirical study Daraio et al. (2010) find that the number of universities
shows an acceleration after 1970 in Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. This phenomenon is strong in Italy where
27 universities have been created between 1982 and 2004.
2According to this official document, the UK government’s strategy aims to create up to
20 new centers of higher education (HE) by 2014.
3Empirical evidence regarding to the existence of the peer group at the university is pro-
vided for the US by Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005),
Hoxby and Weingarth (2005), Aricidiacono et al. (2010)), for Italy by De Giorgi, Pelliz-
zari and Redaelli (2006) and Brunello, De Paola and Scoppa (2010), for China by Ding and
Lehrer (2007) and for South Korea by Kang (2007). The effect of the geographical distance
on the higher university participation has been recently confirmed by Frenette (2004, 2005
and 2009), Sà et al. (2006), Gibbons and Vignoles (2009), Speiss and Wrohlich (2010) and
Kenyon (2010). Frenette (2009) shows that the creation of a local university in Canada is
associated with a large increase in university attendance among local youth in each affected
city. Speiss and Wrohlich (2010) find that in Germany an increase in the distance between
home and university is associated with a lower participation. Gibbons and Vignoles (2009)
show that distance is the strongest factor influencing university choice in Britain.
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peer group maximizer, we obtain that the symmetric system induces the highest
welfare. When the mobility cost is high, moving is so costly that none leaves his
town therefore, given the endogeneity of the peer group, asymmetric equilibria
cannot exist. When replacing monopoly with a symmetric system, individuals
remaining in the ex-monopolist are worse off because they receive a lower peer
group. High ability individuals, that would have switched city to attend the
monopolist, are better off in the "new" university in their city only for high
mobility costs. The new university, though with the lowest quality, allows the
least able individuals (left unskilled by the monopolist) to get skilled without
costs. Overall, the benefit guaranteed to the new skilled offsets the loss for
the individuals that would have studied in the "better" monopolistic univer-
sity. When replacing a monopolistic university with an asymmetric system, all
individuals are better off. In particular, those remaining in the ex-monopolist
receive a higher peer group without paying the mobility cost. Able individu-
als, usually going to the monopolist but that, with two universities, choose the
university in their city, are also better off because the peer group given up in
the better university is even greater than the monopolistic one. Finally, when
we compare symmetric and asymmetric equilibria, we find that the individuals
living in the city of the "better" university (ex-monopolist) unambiguously ben-
efit more from the asymmetric system because they receive a higher peer group,
without mobility costs. The new skilled instead prefer the symmetric system
because it induces a higher peer group in their city. Although able individuals
switching city to attend the "better" university prefer the asymmetric scenario,
all the welfare losses in the symmetric system are offset by the benefits of the
new skilled individuals.
Most of the literature focusing on the peer group effect at university intro-
duces an explicit competition among institutions (see the seminal contribution
in Del Rey (2001), followed by De Fraja and Iossa (2002) and most recently
Del Rey and Wauthy (2006), Gautier and Wauthy (2007), and Grazzini et al.
(2010)). In Del Rey (2001) and De Fraja and Iossa (2002) the peer group
quality is explicitly driven by the competition among universities that set an
admission ability standard and students choose institution according to mobility
costs. As in De Fraja and Iossa (2002), when mobility costs are not too high
we find asymmetric equilibria in which only one university induces the highest
peer group effect. Differently from this literature, we rule out competition and
only focus on the welfare effect from the introduction of a new university. We
show that a new university may allow the ex-monopolist to improve its peer
group by becoming de facto the "better" university of an asymmetric system.
We therefore show that the government itself may increase welfare and keep a
"top" university by simply permitting a new university closes to the monopolist
without necessarily inducing or enforcing an explicit competitive behavior. In
our model the main determinant of the welfare improvement is the sorting be-
havior of the students mainly driven by the reduction in the mobility costs due
to the presence of a new university. Indeed, our policy implication is that a new
university should be permitted especially in zones where mobility costs are high
(for any reasons like lack of material and immaterial infrastructures) without
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necessarily inducing local institutions to compete each other. Differently from
De Fraja and Iossa (2002) but in line with Gautier and Wauthy (2007) and Del
Rey and Wauthy (2006), we propose a refinement of the equilibrium concept
by solving the model also for strong Nash equilibria. We find that asymmetric
equilibria are never strong Nash whereas the symmetric equilibrium is strong
Nash only for sufficiently high mobility costs. Our paper also belongs to the lit-
erature studying the link among geographic constraints, segregation and human
capital accumulation (see Mookherjee, Napel and Ray (2010a, 2010b) among the
most recent papers). They find a reduction in the mobility costs being welfare
increasing if the segregated equilibrium is majority-skilled. Interpreting a new
university as a mobility cost reducing policy, we obtain that a lower mobility
cost is welfare improving when the segregated equilibrium is minority-skilled,
that is the opposite of what they predict.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section
3 analyzes the case with a monopolistic university while in Section 4 we study
a two-university system. In Section 5 we proceed with the welfare analysis.
Section 6 draws the main conclusions.
2 The model
We consider a spatial two-city (j = A,B) model in which each city may host
one university that “produces” graduates. Individuals, i, living in each city
are uniformly and independently distributed according to their innate ability
θi ∈ [0, 1], with the total population in each city normalize to 1. The utility of
each individual i, attending university j, is:5
U ji
(
θj
)
= θi
(
1 + θj
)
(1)
where θj measures the average ability at the university j that henceforth
will be also called peer group effect. The distance between universities (cities)
is normalize to 1. A student located in j has no mobility cost of attending uni-
versity j, but he faces a liner cost t if attending −j 6= j. The (net of t) utility in
(1) is in line with the main assumptions on human capital accumulation, that
are, U jθi > 0, U
j
θj
> 0 and U j
θjθi
> 0. The first derivative simply assumes that
utility increases in the ability. The second derivative introduces the role of the
4Although Mookherjee, Napel and Ray (2010, 2010b) don’t explicitly introduce the peer
group quality, they use a spatial analysis to study how human capital depends on the indi-
vidual location used as proxy for the cost of acquiring skill. They study the welfare effect of a
reduction in the mobility cost by comparing a segregated with an unsegregated equilibrium.
According to their jargon, we can interpret our monopolistic scenario as a segregated equilib-
rium because, as in their model, our "marginal" individual left unskilled by the monopolist
gets instead skilled with a new university. Moreover, in their model a majority-skilled equi-
librium is defined according to the "global fraction of skilled labor" that in our model can be
simply translated in the fraction of individuals attending university. Thus, our monopolistic
equilibrium is consistent with their definition of minority-skilled.
5We are implicitly assuming no drop-out and an over simplified labour market in which
the wage is equal to the human capital.
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peer group effect: utility (as proxy of human capital) increases in the average
ability at the university. The positive cross derivative in the last term implies
that the peer effect becomes more effective in increasing utility (producing hu-
man capital) as the level of the innate ability increases, or in other words high
ability students benefit more from a higher peer group effect. This assumption
follows the seminal contribution by Epple and Romano (2008) and is also in line
with the empirical evidence in Hoxby and Weingarth (2005), Ding and Lehrer
(2007), Kang (2007) and Brunello, De Paola and Scoppa (2010).6
Mobility costs are one of the main economic constraints for students at-
tending university. Some universities, in fact, include these costs when deter-
mining the full cost of attendance and the eligibility for financial aids. In line
with the literature on human capital accumulation (e.g., Banerjee and Newman
1993; Galor and Zeira 1993; Maoz and Moav 1999; Mookherjee and Ray 2003;
Mookherjee, Napel and Ray 2009, 2010) we assume that mobility cost is the
only constraint. When an individual i does not attend the university is defined
unskilled, u, and his utility is:
Ui,u = θi (2)
We keep the labour market as simple as possible because we aim to focus
on the relationship between the peer group and the mobility cost. For the rest
of the paper we consider the peer group effect (average ability) as proxy for the
university quality, therefore we will equivalently use these two terms.7
3 Monopolistic University
In this section we study the scenario with only one university, equivalently
called monopolistic university henceforth. Assume this university is located in
the city A. In this scenario each student can only choose between going to the
monopolistic university and being unskilled. It is straightforward to state that
the monopolistic university (denoted by A) is attended by all the individuals
located in A plus some students from B. Students living in A are clearly better
off by attending the costless university rather than being unskilled. Students
living in B, instead, face linear mobility costs when going to the university in the
other city. Once faced the mobility costs, individuals can freely move between
cities, therefore the peer group is endogenous. Let’s denote θM as the average
ability at the monopolistic university, this is defined in the following Lemma:
6Hoxby and Weingarth (2005) in particular find a positive cross derivative in case of higher
ability peers. For the Italian case, Brunello, De Paola and Scoppa (2010) prove that peer effects
are positive and statistically significant for students enrolled in engineering, math and natural
science and close to zero in the humanities. Less recent evidence is also provided by Sacerdote
(2001) and Zimmerman (2003).
7This simplification is in line with the main existing literature considering the peer group
quality as one of the main component of the university’s objective function, together with
Prestige and Research (De Fraja and Iossa, 2002) and Research (Del Rey 2001).
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Lemma 1 θM is a concave function in the mobility cost for every 0 ≤ t ≤ 0.5,
increasing for low mobility costs and decreasing for high mobility costs.
t>ΘM or  t<0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 Θ
m
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
t
Figure 1
Since all individuals living in A go to the university regardless the mobility
cost, the trend in the figure 1 is due to the sorting behavior of the able individuals
in B. When the mobility cost is too high none from B find it profitable switching
to A. For a "reasonable" mobility cost instead this sorting behavior matters.
A rise in the mobility cost increases the lowest ability such that individuals
from B find it profitable attending the university A. For a moderate rise in the
mobility costs, only less able individuals find it too costly moving to A. When,
instead, the rise in the mobility cost is sufficiently strong, the same effect also
occurs for the high ability individuals and the average ability at the monopolistic
university (A) starts to decrease. For a more rigorous and analytical analysis of
the trend in the figure 1 see the Appendix.
4 Two-University system
Let’s assume the introduction of a new university in the city B (university B
henceforth). In this scenario individuals sort across universities according to
the mobility costs and the peer groups, here denoted by θdA and θ
d
B . What
matters for their choice, other than mobility costs, is the university they receive
the higher peer group quality from. The following Proposition characterizes the
Nash equilibria of the two-university system.8
Proposition 1 There exist two asymmetric equilibria: (i) θd∗A =
1+t
2 , θ
d∗
B =
1+t
4 − 14
√
t2 − 6t+ 1, (ii) θd∗A = 1+t2 , θd∗∗B = 1+t4 + 14
√
t2 − 6t+ 1 for every
t ∈ [0, 3− 2√2] and (iii) a symmetric equilibrium, θ˜dA = θ˜dB = 12 , for every t.
8We recall that t ≤ 1.
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The asymmetric equilibria survive only when the mobility costs are not too
high. Let us analyze the asymmetric equilibrium (i).9 The least able individual
(defined as θ̂B = t(θdA−θdB)
in 17), living in B but preferring university A to B,
in the equilibrium (i) becomes θ̂B = 4tt+√−6t+t2+1+1 , that is increasing in the
mobility cost. When the mobility cost increases, the peer group θd∗A rises and the
same does θ̂B . In words, when the mobility cost increases, the peer group in the
university A must increase to offset this higher cost and still attract individuals
from B. At this higher mobility cost, individuals from B need to be abler and
abler to afford the university A. When mobility costs are sufficiently high (here
t > 3− 2√2) the asymmetric equilibria do not survive because each individual
is better off in the university in its city. In this case moving is so costly that
no individual leaves, therefore the average abilities associated to high mobility
costs must be equal. The general massage here is that increasing individuals’
mobility with the introduction of a new university may lead to polarization if
more able individuals are more likely to move and peer group effects matter.
5 Welfare analysis
In this section we study the welfare effect from allowing a new university in B.
We define the welfare as the unweighted sum of the individual utilities, net of
the mobility costs:
W =
ˆ θ+
θ−
U ji
(
θj
)
dθ (3)
The values θ− and θ+ depend on which group of individuals we consider, and
θj is the peer group (if any) each individual benefits from. To ease the welfare
analysis the following Lemma compares the peer group effects obtained in the
duopolistic and monopolistic case.10
Lemma 2 θd∗B < θ
d∗∗
B < θM < θ
d∗
A and θM > θ˜
d
A = θ˜
d
B > θ
d∗∗
B > θ
d∗
B .
Lemma 2 shows that symmetric universities induce a lower peer group quality
than the monopolist that, in turn, induces a higher quality than the "bottom"
university in the asymmetric system. However, only an asymmetric (unequal)
system produces the highest peer group. The main intuition is that, with an
university in B, individuals from B that go to the ex-monopolist (university A)
must have an ability sufficiently high to induce the peer group in A to over-
come the mobility cost. For the less able individuals that would have attended
the monopolist, but prefer the university B in the new scenario, the save in
9The same arguments hold for the equilibrium (ii).
10Given the result in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 we restrict the analysis to the range
t ≤ 3− 2√2. Also, in the rest of the analysis we do not consider t = 0 because it would imply
θM = θ
d∗
A = 0.5, θ
d∗
B = 0, θ
d∗∗
B = 0.5 and (as it will be clear in what follows) always the same
welfare in the three types of equilibria.
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the mobility cost overcomes the loss from the lower average ability in the new
university (shared with the less able individuals of their city).
Let us now defineWM ,WS andWa as the welfare with respectively monopoly,
symmetric and asymmetric universities. The main result of the paper is stated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 WS > Wa > WM for every t ∈
(
0, 3− 2√2] and WS > WM
for every t ∈ (0, 0.5)
We find that, when mobility costs and peer group effects are the main drivers
of the individuals’ choice, a new university is welfare improving. Both asym-
metric (unequal) and symmetric (equal) systems induce more welfare than a
monopolist, thought the monopolistic university guarantees more quality than
the symmetric system and the new university.
Consider the comparison betweenWS andWM . Given θM > θ˜dA = θ˜
d
B = 0.5,
individuals left unskilled by the monopolist (with ability 0 ≤ θ < tθM ) benefit
from the new university because they get skilled without mobility costs. On the
other hand, students remaining in A are worse off because they benefit from
a lower peer group. However, for the abler individuals in B that would go
to the monopolist but choose the new university B in the symmetric scenario,
the change in the total welfare is ambiguous. These individuals (with ability
t
θM
≤ θ ≤ 1) benefit from the symmetric system only when the mobility cost is
sufficiently high. The intuition is simple, they are better off in the university in
their city only when the save on mobility costs offsets the loss from the lower peer
group. In particular, if we denote their welfare from attending the monopolist
(W˜M ) and the university B (W˜B) as:
W˜M =
ˆ 1
t
θM
(
UM (θM )− t
)
dθ (4)
W˜B =
ˆ 1
t
θM
UB
(
θ˜dB
)
dθ (5)
it is straightforward to see that W˜M ≤ W˜B for every θM (2θM−1)2θM+1 ≤ t.11
Overall the welfare losses for the individuals in A and for the able individ-
uals in B (when t < − θM−2θ2M2θM+1 ) are offset by the welfare improvement for the
(less able) individuals that would have remained unskilled (in B) without the
new university. However, see that when the mobility costs are sufficiently high
(− θM−2θ2M2θM+1 < t) even able individuals in B, that would have gone to the mo-
nopolist, are better off in the symmetric system. Since the peer group of the
monopolist is unambiguously higher than the peer group of the symmetric case,
then we confirm that the mobility cost is the main driver of the welfare effect
when another university is introduced.
The first part of Lemma 2 implies that the monopolist becomes de facto
the "top" university of an asymmetric system. Allowing another university in
11With θM (2θM−1)
2θM+1
< 0.5.
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the near city allows the monopolist to improve its peer group because it loses
the less able individuals previously coming from B. This result replicates the
outcome obtained by the literature on competition among universities where
an "elite" university may maximize the peer group effect and induce a welfare
improvement. The main difference with this literature is that we obtain the
same result without inducing universities to compete each other.
However, although the asymmetric system induces a peer group higher than
the symmetric one, the former induces a lower welfare (Wa < WS). To clarify
this result we compare the welfare changes for the original populations in A
and B. The population in A is clearly better off with an asymmetric system
because θd∗A > θ˜
d
A without mobility costs. The population in B, instead, in the
asymmetric equilibrium is divided in two groups: individuals going to A (with
ability t
θd∗A −θd∗B
≤ θ ≤ 1) and individuals staying put (with ability 0 ≤ θ ≤
t
θd∗A −θd∗B
). The individuals in the first group are better off in the asymmetric
case because they are so able to offset the mobility cost when switching.12 On
the other hand, not surprisingly, the low ability individuals in the second group
are better off in the symmetric system because they benefit from a higher peer
group (θ˜dB > θ
d∗∗
B > θ
d∗
B ). However, the total welfare for the entire population B
is higher in the symmetric system, in fact, after simple substitutions we obtain:
ˆ 1
t
θd∗
A
−θd∗
B
(
UA
(
θd∗A
)− t) dθ + ˆ tθd∗A −θd∗B
0
UB
(
θd∗B
)
dθ <
ˆ 1
0
UB
(
θ˜dB
)
dθ (6)
The left hand side of (6) denotes the welfare for the population B under the
asymmetric equilibrium, with the first and the second term identifying the wel-
fare of the leaving and the remaining individuals. The right hand side denotes
the welfare in the symmetric equilibrium. Thus, we conclude that the welfare
improvement allowed by the asymmetric system to the individuals studying in
A (living there or coming from B) is offset by the loss induced to the (least able)
individuals in B. It is easy to check that all these arguments (and inequalities)
also hold for the asymmetric equilibrium (ii), therefore we omit the analysis.
6 Equilibrium refinements
In the previous sections we solve the model only for Nash equilibria. This
means that no individual unilaterally deviates from his own equilibrium strat-
egy. However, if we allow individuals to form coalitions, we cannot exclude that
individuals and/or students form coalitions that optimally choose strategies dif-
ferent from each individual equilibrium strategy. In the common jargon such a
coalition is defined deviating coalition. According to the main literature a Nash
12With simple algebra it is possible to show that
´ 1
t
θd∗
A
−θd∗
B
(
UA
(
θd∗A
)− t) dθ >
´ 1
t
θd∗
A
−θd∗
B
UB
(
θ˜dB
)
dθ.
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equilibrium is strong Nash when no deviating coalition exists. In this section
we check for this equilibrium refinement. The following propositions give the
main results.
Proposition 3 The symmetric equilibrium is strong Nash only for t > 0.086.
When the mobility costs are sufficiently high, no profitable deviating coali-
tion exists because the mobility costs always offset the benefit from the average
ability received once switched university.
Proposition 4 The asymmetric equilibria are never strong Nash.
The Proposition 4 shows that when students are polarized over two asym-
metric universities there exists at least a deviating coalition. This is the case
for the coalition composed of all the individuals from B that go to A in the
asymmetric equilibrium. Should they form such a coalition, the save on mo-
bility costs (from going back to B) would offset the lost of the higher average
ability in the "top" university.
7 Main conclusions
This paper starts from two empirical results: i) the existence of the peer group
effect at the higher education, and ii) the proliferation of universities, especially
in Europe. We link these two results and theoretically investigate the effect
of introducing a new university when individuals choose institutions according
to the peer group effect, innate ability and mobility costs. We compare a mo-
nopolistic system with a two-university scenario in which universities may differ
in their peer group effects. The introduction of a new university induces both
symmetric (same peer groups and same number of students) and asymmetric
(different peer groups and attendance) equilibria. Our first result is that permit-
ting a new university is unambiguously welfare improving. Most important, a
symmetric system maximizes the welfare, thought it provides less quality than
the "top" university of the asymmetric system. In particular, the symmetric
system widens university participation to the unskilled (less able) individuals
and spares the mobility costs to the able individuals that otherwise would need
to switch city to study. Although less able individuals are the only benefiting
mostly from a symmetric system, their welfare improvement offsets the losses
for the other individuals. Our results show that widening participation at the
higher education level maximizes the social welfare even when government does
not induce universities to compete each other.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Here we show that θM is a concave function in t for every t ∈ [0, 0.5],
with 0.5 ≤ θM ≤ 0.5858, and θM = 0.5 for t = 0 and t ≥ 0.5, with maximum
(θM = 0.58) at t = 0.34. See the figure (1). The average ability of students
living in A is θmA =
´ 1
0
θdθ´ 1
0
dθ
= 12 while, all students coming from B are such that:
UAi (θM )− t ≥ Ui,u (7)
then they have the following ability:
θ ≥ t
θM
(8)
θ ∈ [0, 1] restricts the analysis to t ≤ θM . The average ability of students coming
from B is then:
θmB =
´ 1
t
θM
θdθ
´ 1
t
θM
dθ
=
1
2
(
t
θM
+ 1
)
(9)
By computing the weighted average of θmA and θ
m
B , θM is the result of the
following equation:
θM =
1
2 +
(
1− tθM
)
θmB
1 +
(
1− tθM
) (10)
that, after rearranging, becomes:
2θ3M +
t2
2
− θ2M (1 + t) = 0 (11)
the solutions with respect to t are: t1 = θ2M −
√
∆ and t2 = θ2M −
√
∆, with
∆ = 2θ2M − 4θ3M + 4θ4M . See that if θM ≥ 0.5, t1 and t2 are both positive. In
particular, ∆ = 0 at θM = 0.5858, but ∆ is a complex number for θM > 0.5858.
See the figure 1 where θM is on the horizontal axis and the black (red) curve
denotes t2 (t1). When θM < 0.5, t can be greater than θM or negative. However,
a negative t and t > θM are ruled out by assumption. In particular t > θM
implies that the ability of the "marginal" individual indifferent from going to
the monopolist or remaining in B, tθM , is greater than 1, that clearly contradicts
the assumption θi ∈ [0, 1]. In words, if t > θM no marginal individual would
exist because no individual from B switches to A, with the consequence that
the average ability in A is only given by the average ability of the individuals
living there.
Proof of Proposition 1
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Proof. Each individual living in A, with ability θ, chooses the university B if:
UA
(
θdA
) ≤ UB (θdB)− t (12)
that gives:
θ
(
θdA − θdB
) ≤ −t (13)
an individual living in B, instead, goes to the university A if:
UA
(
θdA
)− t ≥ UB (θdB) (14)
that gives:
θ
(
θdA − θdB
) ≥ t (15)
This enables us to define the peer groups in the two universities as:
θdA =
´ tθd
B
−θd
A
0 θdθ +
´ 1
t
θd
A
−θd
B
θdθ
´ tθd
B
−θd
A
0 dθ +
´ 1
t
θd
A
−θd
B
dθ
θdB =
´ tθd
A
−θd
B
0 θdθ +
´ 1
t
θd
B
−θd
A
θdθ
´ tθd
A
−θd
B
0 dθ +
´ 1
t
θd
B
−θd
A
dθ
(16)
To find the equilibrium values of θdA and θ
d
B from (16), we need some further
specifications on the integrals. The first and the second term of the numerators
identify respectively the ability of the students living in that city and those
coming from the other. The denominators simply give their mass. The thresh-
olds t
θdB−θdA
and t
θdA−θdB
depend on which university has the higher peer group.
Let’s check whether symmetric and asymmetric scenarios may characterize Nash
equilibria. 1) Asymmetric scenario: θdA > θ
d
B . All individuals living in A
choose the university A while individuals living in B choose the university A if
their ability satisfies the following condition:
θ ≥ θ̂B = t(
θdA − θdB
) (17)
We then have to put t
θdB−θdA
= 1 in (16) and by solving the system between the
two averages in (16), we find:
θd∗A =
1 + t
2
, θd∗B =
1 + t
4
− 1
4
√
t2 − 6t+ 1 (18)
θd∗A =
1 + t
2
, θd∗∗B =
1 + t
4
+
1
4
√
t2 − 6t+ 1 (19)
with −6t + t2 + 1 > 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 3 − 2√2. Note that we must also satisfy
t < θd∗A − θd∗B and t < θd∗A − θd∗∗B , after a simple substitution we find that this
occurs for every t ≤ 3− 2√2, therefore we conclude that the mobility cost must
satisfy t ≤ 3 − 2√2. It is also easy to check that θd∗A , θd∗B , θd∗∗B < 1 for every
0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Clearly, there would exist other equilibrium values for θdB ,θdA, with
θdB > θ
d
A, obtained by inverting the subscripts in (i) in the proposition 1. The
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only difference is that all individuals living in B choose the university B while
individuals living in A choose the university B only if their ability satisfies the
condition:
θ ≥ θ̂A = −t(
θdA − θdB
) (20)
where, in the integrals, we must now put t
θdA−θdB
= 1. The rest of the procedure
replicates what we have done for the case θdA > θ
d
B therefore we omit it. We need
a further check to conclude that asymmetric equilibria exist, that is, no student
has an incentive to deviate from its equilibrium choice. Since we are in the
continuous, the mass of any single student switching university is 0, therefore the
average ability of the university the student is switching to is not affected by his
switching.13 Let’s start by considering a possible deviation for one student that,
in equilibrium, goes fromB to A (with ability θ ≥ t
θd∗A −θd∗B
= t1
4 (t+
√−6t+t2+1+1) ).
He deviates from the asymmetric equilibrium (i) (stays in B) if the following
inequality holds:
UA
(
θd∗A
)− t < UB (θd∗B ) (21)
that gives:
θ <
4t
t+ 1 +
√−6t+ t2 + 1 (22)
Inequality (22) simply defines the ability of any deviating individual. How-
ever, see that the deviating student with ability in the range (22) does not
belong to the group going from B to A in the asymmetric equilibrium (i)
(θ ≥ 4t
t+
√−6t+t2+1+1 ). Thus, no deviation occurs. Now we check whether at
least one individual remaining in B in the asymmetric equilibrium deviates by
switching to A. This occurs if:
UA
(
θd∗A
)− t > UB (θd∗B ) (23)
that clearly gives the opposite range of (22):
θ >
4t
t+ 1 +
√−6t+ t2 + 1 (24)
Again, all individuals with ability in this range do not belong to the group
remaining in B in the asymmetric case (with ability θ < 4t
t+
√−6t+t2+1+1 ). Thus
we conclude that the asymmetric equilibrium exists. The same result holds for
the asymmetric equilibrium (ii).
(2) Symmetric scenario: θ˜dA = θ˜
d
B =
1
2 . The symmetric equilibrium is
straightforward by construction because when the average abilities equalize then
all individuals remain in their city, therefore we have θ˜dA = θ˜
d
B =
1
2 with
t
θdB−θdA
=
t
θdA−θdB
= 1. In order to show the existence of the symmetric equilibrium we check
13This result does not hold if we consider deviations by coalitions of individuals, in which
case the mass of the switching students (the coalition) is no longer equal to 0. This approach
would imply the necessity to focus on strong Nash equilibria. We do this further step in the
equilibrium refinement in Section 6.
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that no student has an incentive to switch university in equilibrium. Again, the
mass of any student switching university is 0, therefore average abilities are
unaffected by switching. Consider a student attending A in equilibrium. The
condition not to deviate (going to B) becomes:
UA
(
θ˜dA
)
> UB(θ˜dB)− t (25)
that is always satisfied. The same argument holds for students attending uni-
versity B.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The second part of the Lemma 2 follows directly from Lemma 1 and
the values of θ˜dA and θ˜
d
B in the Proposition 1. To show the first part we start
from (11) and define the function F (θ) = 2θ3 + t
2
2 − θ2 (1 + t), reminding that
F (θM ) = 0 with F (.) increasing (decreasing) in θ for θ ≥ 13 t + 13 (θ < 13 t + 13 ).
Given this result, by plugging θd∗A into F (θ) we obtain F
(
θd∗A
)
= 12 t
2 > 0, hence
we have θd∗A ≥ θM under θM ≥ 13 t + 13 and θd∗A ≥ 13 t + 13 . Proposition 1 and
Lemma 1 in fact restrict the mobility cost to the range t ∈ (0, 3− 2√2] that
makes the threshold 13 t+
1
3 vary between
1
3 and 0.39052. This is enough to show
that condition θ ≥ 13 t+ 13 is always satisfied because we have 0.5 ≤ θM ≤ 0.5858
and 0.5 ≤ θ∗A ≤ 0.5858. We may also see that: a) θd∗A = θM = 0.5 for t = 0, and
b) θM = 0.5625 and θd∗A = 0.5858 for t = 3 − 2
√
2. The same procedure gives
F
(
θd∗B
)
< 0 and F
(
θd∗∗B
)
< 0 that imply respectively θd∗B < θM and θ
d∗∗
B < θM .
Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. 1) Monopoly vs symmetric universities: Wa > WM . We re-
mind that the mobility cost such that the asymmetric equilibria exist is t ∈(
0, 3− 2√2]. The result in Lemma 2 implies that individuals remaining in the
university A even in the asymmetric equilibrium are better off because they re-
ceive a higher peer group without paying any mobility cost. Individuals from B
that would not go to the monopolist but only attend the new university B, are
also better off because they get skilled without costs as well. Now, if there exists
a group of individuals from B attending the monopolist but also preferring the
university B in the asymmetric equilibrium, then these students are better off
after the introduction of the university B because they would have preferred B
even to the monopolist since θd∗A > θM . 2) Monopoly vs symmetric uni-
versities: WS > WM . Since the symmetric equilibrium exists for any t, we
focus on t ∈ (0, 0.5)14. The values of WM and WS are:15
WM =
ˆ 1
0
UM (θM ) dθ +
ˆ 1
t
θM
(
UM (θM )− t
)
dθ +
ˆ t
θM
0
Uudθ (26)
14We remind that, by Proposition 1, we have θM = 0.5 for every t ≥ 0.5
15We rule out the subscript i to ease the analysis.
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WS =
ˆ 1
0
UA
(
θ˜dA
)
dθ +
ˆ 1
0
UB
(
θ˜dB
)
dθ = 1.5 (27)
Where the first two integrals in WM include the utilities of individuals studying
in A, because living there (the first) or coming from B (the second). The last
term defines individuals left unskilled in B. We find that WS ≥ WM for every
θM −
√
θM (1− θM ) < t, that holds in our range of t. To show this result
we simply take the values t1 and t2 from the proof of the Proposition 1, and
see that θM −
√
θM (1− θM ) < t1 and θM −
√
θM (1− θM ) < t2 for every
0.5 ≤ θM ≤ 0.5858. 3) Symmetric vs asymmetric universities: WS > Wa.
Let us define Wa as the welfare in the asymmetric equilibrium (i), with:
Wa =
ˆ 1
0
UA
(
θd∗A
)
dθ +
ˆ 1
t
θd∗
A
−θd∗
B
(
UA
(
θd∗A
)− t) dθ + ˆ tθd∗A −θd∗B
0
UB
(
θd∗B
)
dθ
(28)
The first two terms in Wa represent the utilities of individuals studying in A,
because living there (the first) or coming from B (the second). The last term
includes the utilities of the less able skilled in B. After substituting for θd∗A and
θd∗B into (28), we find Ws ≥ Wa for every t ≤ 3 − 2
√
2. The same result holds
for the asymmetric equilibrium (ii). It is straightforward to see that, in line
with the footnote (10), for t = 0 and t = 0.5 we would have Wa = WM and
WS > WM respectively.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. We check whether there exists any coalition deviating from the symmet-
ric equilibrium. Let us define a coalition composed of students with the lowest
ability equal to a and with mass 1 − a. We also define an optimal coalition
as a group of students with ability θ ∈ [a∗, 1], where a∗ is the ability of the
least able student maximizing the gain the coalition receives when deviating
from the equilibrium strategy. We start by considering the coalition composed
of students that in equilibrium are in B. The gain from the deviation is given
by the peer group the coalition will find in the new university (denoted here
by θ̂A). If a coalition of mass 1 − a switches to the university A, the new peer
group in A becomes:
θ̂A =
´ 1
0
θdθ +
´ 1
a
θdθ´ 1
0
dθ +
´ 1
a
dθ
=
1
2a
2 − 1
a− 2 (29)
the first term in the numerator represents the students already in A, whereas the
second term identifies the coalition of students coming from B. The condition
for this coalition not to deviate is:
UB
(
θ˜dB
)
≥ UA
(
θ̂∗A
)
− t (30)
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where the left hand side is the utility from remaining in B, while the right hand
side is the utility when switching university, computed at θ̂∗A = θ̂A (a
∗). Where
a∗ is
a∗ = arg max
a
UA
(
θ̂A
)
−
(
t+ UB
(
θ˜dB
))
= 0.5858 (31)
We obtain θ̂∗A = 0.5858 with the mass of this coalition equal to 0.4142. To
show that the coalition as a whole does not deviate it is sufficient to show that
(30) holds for the ablest individual of the coalition (θ = 1) because he has the
highest benefit from the deviation.16 By simply substituting θ = 1 into (30) we
see that it holds for every t > 0.086. The same results hold for the coalition of
students going from A to B.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider the peer groups of the asymmetric equilibria ((i) and (ii)) in
the Proposition 2. To show that the asymmetric equilibria are not strong Nash
it is enough to show the existence of at least one deviating coalition. Consider
the ad hoc coalition composed of individuals that, in equilibrium, go from B to
A (with θ ∈ [a, 1] and a = t
θd∗A −θd∗B
), such that the peer group they receive in B,
once deviated, is just θ˜dB =
1
2 . The condition for the deviation to be profitable
is:
UB
(
θ˜dB
)
≥ UA (θd∗A )− t (32)
that always holds. This is enough to show that the asymmetric equilibria are
never Strong Nash.
References
[1] Arcidiacono, P. Foster G., Goodpaster N., Kinsler J., 2011. Estimating
spillovers using panel data, with an application to the classroom. mimeo
[2] Arcidiacono, P., Nicholson, S., 2005. Peer effects in medical schools. Journal
of Public Economics 89, 327-350.
[3] Banerjee, A.V., Newman, A.F., 1993. Occupational choice and the process
of development. Journal of Political Economy 101, 274–298.
[4] Brunello G., De Paola M., Scoppa V., 2010. Peer effects in higher education:
does the field of study matter? Economic Inquiry 48, 621-634.
[5] Daraio C., et al. 2010. The European university landscape: a micro charac-
terization based on evidence from the Aquameth project. Research Policy
40, 148–164.
16See, in fact, that
∂
(
UA(θ̂∗A)−
(
t+UB
(
θ˜dB
)))
∂θ
= 0.0858 > 0.
16
[6] De Paola M., Scoppa, V., 2010. Peer group effects on the academic perfor-
mance of Italian students. Applied Economics 42, 2203-2215.
[7] De Fraja, G., Iossa, E., 2002. Competition among universities and the
emergence of the elite institution. Bulletin of Economic Research 54, 275–
294.
[8] De Giorgi G., Pellizzari M., Redaelli S., 2010. Identification of social in-
teractions through partially overlapping peer groups. American Economic
Journal: applied economics 2, 241-275.
[9] Del Rey, E., 2001. Teaching versus research: a model of state university
competition. Journal of Urban Economics 49, 356-373.
[10] Del Rey, E., Wauthy, G., 2006.Mencion De Calidad: reducing inefficiencies
in higher education markets when there are network externalities. Investi-
gationes Economicas XXX, 89-115.
[11] Ding, W., Lehrer, S.F., 2007. Do peers affect student achievement in
China’s secondary schools? Review of Economics and Statistics 89, 300–
312.
[12] Epple, D., Romano, R., 2008. Educational vouchers and cream skimming.
International Economic Review 49, 1395-1435.
[13] Frenette, M., 2004. Access to college and university: does distance to school
matter? Canadian Public Policy 30, 427-443.
[14] Frenette, M., 2005. Too far to go on? Distance to school and university
participation. Education Economics 14, 31-58.
[15] Frenette, M., 2009. Do universities benefit local youth? Evidence from the
creation of new universities. Economics of Education Review 28, 318–328.
[16] Galor, O., Zeira, J., 1993. Income distribution and macroeconomics. Review
of Economic Studies 60, 35–52.
[17] Gautier, A., Wauthy, X., 2007. Teaching versus research: a multi-tasking
approach to multi-department universities. European Economic Review 51,
273–295.
[18] Gibbons, S., Vignoles, A., 2009. Access, choice and participation in higher
education, CEE DP 101.
[19] Grazzini, L., Luporini A., Petretto A., 2011. Competition between State
Universities. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3373.
[20] Higher education funding council for England (HEFCE). A new
university challenge: unlocking Britain’s talent (2008). 2008/27.
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dius.gov.uk/policy/documents/university-
challenge.pdf
17
[21] Hoxby, C.M., Weingart, G., 2005. Taking Race out of the equation: school
reassignment and the structure of peer effects. Unpublished manuscript.
[22] Kang, C., 2007. Classroom peer effects and academic achievement: quasi-
randomization evidence from South Korea. Journal of Urban Economics
61, 458-495.
[23] Kenyon, S., 2010. Widening participation: a role for transport? UK higher
education policy and mobility related educational exclusion.Widening Par-
ticipation and Lifelong Learning 2.
[24] Maoz, Y.D., Moav, O., 1999. Intergenerational Mobility and the Process of
Development. Economic Journal 109, 677–697.
[25] Mookherjee, D., et al. (2010a). Aspirations, segregation and occupational
choice. Journal of the European Economic Association 8,139-168.
[26] Mookherjee, D., et al. (2010b). Social interactions and segregation in skill
accumulation. Journal of the European Economic Association 8, 1–13.
[27] Mookherjee, D., Ray, D., 2003. Persistent Inequality. Review of Economic
Studies 70, 369–393.
[28] OECD 2006. Thematic review of tertiary education. Country background
for Sweden. Report prepared by the Swedish National Agency for Higher
Education.
[29] Ost, B., 2010. The role of peers and grades in determining major persistence
in the sciences. Economics of Education Review 29, 923-934.
[30] Sá, C., et al. 2006. Does accessibility to higher education matter? Choice
behavior of high school graduates in the Netherlands. Spatial Economic
Analysis 1, 155-174.
[31] Sacerdote, B., 2001. Peer effects with random assignment: results for Dart-
mouth roommates. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 681-704.
[32] Spiess, C.K, Wrohlich, K., 2010. Does distance determine who attends a
university in Germany? Economics of Education Review 29, 470–479.
[33] Zimmerman, D., 2003. Peer effects in academic outcomes: evidence from a
natural experiment. Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 9-23.
18
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2012/3. Jeroen K. ROMBOUTS, Lars STENTOFT and Francesco VIOLANTE. The value of 
multivariate model sophistication: An application to pricing Dow Jones Industrial Average 
options. 
2012/4. Aitor CALO-BLANCO. Responsibility, freedom, and forgiveness in health care. 
2012/5. Pierre PESTIEAU and Grégory PONTHIERE. The public economics of increasing longevity. 
2012/6. Thierry BRECHET and Guy MEUNIER. Are clean technology and environmental quality 
conflicting policy goals? 
2012/7. Jens L.  HOUGAARD, Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO and Lars P. ØSTERDAL. A new 
axiomatic approach to the evaluation of population health. 
2012/8. Kirill BORISSOV, Thierry BRECHET and Stéphane LAMBRECHT. Environmental 
maintenance in a dynamic model with heterogenous agents. 
2012/9. Ken-Ichi SHIMOMURA and Jacques-François THISSE. Competition among the big and the 
small. 
2012/10. Pierre PESTIEAU and Grégory PONTHIERE. Optimal lifecycle fertility in a Barro-Becker 
economy. 
2012/11. Catherine KRIER, Michel MOUCHART and Abderrahim OULHAJ. Neural modelling of 
ranking data with an application to stated preference data. 
2012/12. Matthew O. JACKSON and Dunia LOPEZ-PINTADO. Diffusion and contagion in networks 
with heterogeneous agents and homophily. 
2012/13. Claude D'ASPREMONT, Rodolphe DOS SANTOS FERREIRA and Jacques THEPOT. Hawks 
and doves in segmented markets: A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness. 
2012/14. Claude D'ASPREMONT and Rodolphe DOS SANTOS FERREIRA. Household behavior and 
individual autonomy: An extended Lindahl mechanism. 
2012/15. Dirk VAN DE GAER, Joost VANDENBOSSCHE and José Luis FIGUEROA. Children's 
health opportunities and project evaluation: Mexico's Oportunidades program. 
2012/16. Giacomo VALLETTA. Health, fairness and taxation. 
2012/17. Chiara CANTA and Pierre PESTIEAU. Long term care insurance and family norms. 
2012/18. David DE LA CROIX and Fabio MARIANI. From polygyny to serial monogamy: a unified 
theory of marriage institutions. 
2012/19. Carl GAIGNE, Stéphane RIOU and Jacques-François THISSE. Are compact cities 
environmentally friendly? 
2012/20. Jean-François CARPANTIER and Besik SAMKHARADZE. The asymmetric commodity 
inventory effect on the optimal hedge ratio. 
2012/21. Concetta MENDOLICCHIO, Dimitri PAOLINI and Tito PIETRA. Asymmetric information 
and overeducation. 
2012/22. Tom TRUYTS. Stochastic signaling: Information substitutes and complements. 
2012/23. Pierre DEHEZ and Samuel FEREY. How to share joint liability: A cooperative game approach. 
2012/24. Pilar GARCIA-GOMEZ, Erik SCHOKKAERT, Tom VAN OURTI and Teresa BAGO D'UVA. 
Inequity in the face of death. 
2012/25. Christian HAEDO and Michel MOUCHART. A stochastic independence approach for different 
measures of concentration and specialization. 
2012/26. Xavier RAMOS and Dirk VAN DE GAER. Empirical approaches to inequality of opportunity: 
principles, measures, and evidence. 
2012/27. Jacques H. DRÈZE and Erik SCHOKKAERT. Arrow's theorem of the deductible : moral 
hazard and stop-loss in health insurance. 
2012/28 Luc BAUWENS and Giuseppe STORTI. Computationally efficient inference procedures for 
vast dimensional realized covariance models. 
2012/29. Pierre DEHEZ. Incomplete-markets economies: The seminar work of Diamond, Drèze and 
Radner. 
2012/30 Helmuth CREMER, Pierre PESTIEAU and Grégory PONTHIÈRE. The economics of long-
term care: a survey. 
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers - continued 
 
2012/31 Mathieu VAN VYVE, Laurence A. WOLSEY and Hande YAMAN. Relaxations for two-level 
multi-item lot-sizing problem. 
2012/32 Jean-François MERTENS and Anna RUBINCHIK. Equilibria in an overlapping generations 
model with transfer policies and exogenous growth. 
2012/33 Jean-François MERTENS and Anna RUBINCHIK. Pareto optimality of the golden rule 
equilibrium in an overlapping generations model with production and transfers. 
2012/34 Hélène LATZER and Florian MAYNERIS. Income distribution and vertical comparative 
advantage. Theory and evidence. 
2012/35 Pascal MOSSAY and Takatoshi TABUCHI. Preferential trade agreements harm third countries. 
2012/36 Aitor CALO-BLANCO. The compensation problem with fresh starts. 
2012/37 Jean-François CARPANTIER and Arnaud DUFAYS. Commodities volatility and the theory of 
storage. 
2012/38 Jean-François CARPANTIER and Christelle SAPATA. Unfair inequalities in France: A 
regional comparison. 
2012/39 Shui-Ki WAN, Shin-Huei WANG and Chi-Keung WOO. Total tourist arrival forecast: 
aggregation vs. disaggregation. 
2012/40 Thierry BRECHET, Yann MENIERE and Pierre M. PICARD. The clean development 
mechanism in a global carbon market. 
2012/41 Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS, Rafael MONER-COLONQUES, Vicente ORTS and José J. 
SEMPERE-MONERRIS. Theoretical and experimental insights on firms' internationalization 
decisions under uncertainty. 
2012/42 Berardino CESI and Dimitri PAOLINI. Peer group and distance: when widening university 
participation is better. 
 
Books 
 
G. DURANTON, Ph. MARTIN, Th. MAYER and F. MAYNERIS (2010), The economics of clusters – 
Lessons from the French experience. Oxford University Press. 
J. HINDRIKS and I. VAN DE CLOOT (2011), Notre pension en heritage. Itinera Institute. 
M. FLEURBAEY and F. MANIQUET (2011), A theory of fairness and social welfare. Cambridge University 
Press. 
V. GINSBURGH and S. WEBER (2011), How many languages make sense? The economics of linguistic 
diversity. Princeton University Press. 
I. THOMAS, D. VANNESTE and X. QUERRIAU (2011), Atlas de Belgique – Tome 4 Habitat. Academia 
Press. 
W. GAERTNER and E. SCHOKKAERT (2012), Empirical social choice. Cambridge University Press. 
L. BAUWENS, Ch. HAFNER and S. LAURENT (2012), Handbook of volatility models and their 
applications. Wiley. 
J-C. PRAGER and J. THISSE (2012), Economic geography and the unequal development of regions. 
Routledge. 
M. FLEURBAEY and F. MANIQUET (2012), Equality of opportunity: the economics of responsibility. 
World Scientific. 
J. HINDRIKS (2012), Gestion publique. De Boeck. 
 
CORE Lecture Series 
 
R. AMIR (2002), Supermodularity and complementarity in economics. 
R. WEISMANTEL (2006), Lectures on mixed nonlinear programming. 
A. SHAPIRO (2010), Stochastic programming: modeling and theory. 
